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Civil Procedure: Medical Malpractice Gets Eerie: The
Erie Implications of a Heightened Pleading Burden in
Oklahoma*
L Introduction
Medical care has become a frightening expense in the twenty-first century.
The growing number of medical malpractice lawsuits represents a large factor
in the increasing cost of medical treatment.! In an effort to curb the alarming
growth rate of medical malpractice actions over the past several decades,2
legislatures around the country have enacted measures to heighten the
standards and procedures under which plaintiffs can bring medical liability
actions.3 In 2003, the Oklahoma legislature followed the trend of other states
by passing the Affordable Access to Health Care Act (Health Care Act),4
which requires plaintiffs in a medical liability action to attach an affidavit to
their petition attesting that they have consulted an expert and have received
a written opinion from that expert concluding, after an examination of the
available facts, that the plaintiff s claim is meritorious.5
The Health Care Act embodies a legislative effort to reform medical
liability to increase access to health care services while simultaneously
decreasing the cost of liability insurance for such actions.6 The Oklahoma
legislature designed the Health Care Act to ensure that a plaintiffs
* Winner, 2003-2004 Sharp Award for Outstanding Comment.
The author would like to thank Professor Meg Penrose for her edits, advice, and
encouragement throughout the writing of this comment. The author would also like to thank
Professor Steven Gensler for introducing Erie and the rest of civil procedure in an interesting
and understandable manner.
1. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2003), GPO Access,
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/sou/index.html [hereinafter Bush, State of the Union
Address] ("[O]ne of the prime causes of higher cost[s] [of our health care system] ... [is] the
constant threat that physicians and hospitals will be unfairly sued. Because of excessive
litigation, everybody pays more for health care .... ").
2. Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 413 (1987) (noting that in the decade from
1975-1984, the number of medical malpractice claims filed per doctor grew by about 10% each
year).
3. Nancy M. Simone, Medical Malpractice Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of United
States and Great Britain, 12 SuFFoLKTRANSNAT'LL.J. 577,577 (1989) (discussing the medical
malpractice crisis of the 1970s that caused nearly all states to pass laws attempting to limit the
number of malpractice claims filed by plaintiffs).
4. 63 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1-1708.1E (West Supp. 2004).
5. Id.
6. S.B. 629, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2003) (enacted).
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meritorious medical liability claim will receive "fair and adequate
compensation" and to improve the overall "fairness and cost-effectiveness
of... [Oklahoma's] current medical liability system" by placing a procedural
barrier in the path of medical malpractice plaintiffs filing suit in Oklahoma.7
This comment analyzes whether Oklahoma's newly ratified Health Care
Act, which mandates a heightened pleading standard as a prerequisite to a
medical malpractice suit, applies in a diversity action in federal court.
Because the Oklahoma statute requires the plaintiff to attach an affidavit at the
pleading stage of litigation, this comment considers the Health Care Act's
applicability in light of the notice pleading standard under Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 This comment ultimately concludes that
because Federal Rule 8 already covers the level of pleading required in federal
courts, federal judges should refrain from applying the heightened pleading
requirements of Oklahoma's Health Care Act.
In Part II, this comment sets forth a practical and user-friendly analysis of
the Erie doctrine9 that a federal judge can apply to any situation in which
litigants ask a federal judge to apply state law rather than federal law. Part III
compares various state statutes that require plaintiffs to file expert affidavits
when bringing a medical malpractice action. Additionally, Part 11I considers
the consequences when district judges within a single state use varying
approaches in interpreting the scope of one of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Part IV emphasizes the importance of determining the source of
the controlling federal standard that arguably should prohibit a federal court
from applying a state statute that affects pleading at the federal level. Part IV
particularly considers the scope of Federal Rule 8 over federal court
pleadings. Finally, Part V applies a full Erie analysis to the Health Care Act
to provide guidance to Oklahoma federal courts choosing whether to apply the
pleading requirements of the Health Care Act or Federal Rule 8 in medical
malpractice suits.
1I. The Erie Doctrine: Not As Scary As It Sounds
Like fingernails on a chalkboard or a wolf howling in darkness that is
disturbed only by the light of a full moon, the mere mention of Erie causes
most people who dwell in the legal world to shudder or cringe with fright.
Such feelings most likely stem from a misunderstanding of the ideas and
7. Id.
8. FED. R. CIv. P. 8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. The Erie doctrine is the body of Supreme Court jurisprudence beginning with Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that advises federal courts when to apply federal




analytical framework embodied in the jurisprudence handed down from the
U.S. Supreme Court labeled "The Erie Doctrine." Unsurprisingly, many
people do not hold Erie in high regard because of the doctrine's perceived
complexities. In fact, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently
recognized that the pivotal classifications of the Erie doctrine, such as those
distinguishing substance from procedure, can be "a challenging endeavor."'0
One district court judge went so far as to proclaim that "[i]f there has been a
spell cast by these Erie incantations... it has produced more befuddlement
than enchantment."'" By examining the doctrine from a perspective that
revolves around the origins of the arguably applicable federal law, however,
an analytical framework can be formed that makes Erie easier to apply and
understand, contrary to most lawyers' initial fears.
A. A User-Friendly Analytical Framework of the Erie Doctrine
Federal courts and litigants may use the following "user-friendly" analysis
in a federal diversity action when one of the litigants argues that the judge
must apply the state standard or law rather than the federal standard or law.
While this analysis is admittedly not a perfected scientific formula, it is
intended to serve as a solid framework on which federal judges and litigants
can build an Erie analysis. 2
As in any legal problem, the logical place to start is to define the issue. In
an Erie problem, this requires identifying both the federal source of law and
the state source of law. Thus, the first important question to ask is not
whether the state law is substantive or procedural. A number of courts have
mistakenly begun their Erie analysis with this inquiry in hopes of achieving
a quick answer. 3 In an effort to oversimplify Erie, these courts are distracted
10. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,427 (1996).
11. Robert K. Harris, Brown v. Nichols: The Eleventh Circuit Refuses to Play the Erie
Game with Georgia's Expert Affidavit Requirement, 29 GA. L. REv. 291, 291 (1994) (quoting
J. Aron & Co. v. Serv. Transp. Co., 515 F. Supp. 428, 435 n.8 (D. Md. 1981)).
12. In setting forth his practical framework of Erie, accomplished professor Allan Ides
acknowledged the Court's "doctrinal schizophrenia" in the Erie realm and cautioned that, as
with any framework, flexibility and judgment must play an integral role in its application. Allan
Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to be Applied in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the
Development andApplication of the Erie Doctrine andRelated Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19,74-75
(1995).
13. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (beginning its
Erie analysis by stating that "[a] federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law"); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d
1523, 1539 (10th Cir. 1996) (initiating its Erie analysis by focusing on the line between
substance and procedure and noting, "Erie held that federal courts adjudicating diversity
jurisdiction claims should apply substantive state law"); Poindexter v. Bonsukan, 145 F. Supp.
2d 800, 803 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (starting its Erie discussion by saying that "[flederal courts apply
2004] 979
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from the true, "structured" path of the Erie search and often err in their final
Erie determination.' 4 Instead, in an Erie analysis, federal courts must first
determine the source of the federal law.
1. The Federal Law Stems from the U.S. Constitution or an Act of
Congress
If the federal law stems directly from the U.S. Constitution, the Supremacy
Clause requires federal courts to apply the federal standard. 5 If, however,
Congress directly created the federal law via a statute, then federal courts must
first determine whether the statute is "sufficiently broad to control the issue
before the Court."' 6 In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,7 the
Supreme Court explained that courts should engage in a "straightforward
exercise in statutory interpretation" when deciding whether the federal statute
at issue encompasses the point in dispute.'
If the court determines that the federal statute covers the dispute at issue,
the court should next consider whether Congress spoke within its
constitutional powers when enacting the statute.' 9 Congress enacts laws in
harmony with the Constitution when it uses the powers given by Article I,
state substantive law when adjudicating diversity-jurisdiction claims, but in doing so apply
federal procedural law to the proceedings") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
14. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-i v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 334, 340
(D.N.J. 1997) (noting that the Erie doctrine "has occasionally (and both misleadingly and
unhelpfully), been characterized as a question of whether the state statute is 'substantive' or
'procedural.' However, the test is much more structured, yet no less difficult to apply, than the
frequently daunting choice between the two.").
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
16. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 (1988) (stating that "when the
federal law sought to be applied is a congressional statute, the first and chief question for the
district court's determination is whether the statute is 'sufficiently broad to control the issue
before the Court"') (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980)).
17. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
18. Id. at 26. The Stewart Court noted that the federal law and state law at issue do not
have to be "perfectly coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at hand." Id. at 27 n.4 ("It
would make no sense for the supremacy of federal law to wane precisely because there is no
state law directly on point."). As Professor Allan Ides has noted, "[t]he lesson to be learned
from Ricoh is that a federal procedural statute trumps contrary state law in a diversity case so
long as the federal statute is designed to apply to the circumstances and so long as the federal
statute can be classified as procedural." Ides, supra note 12, at 77.
19. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 27 (summarizing this inquiry by succinctly stating that "[i]f
Congress intended to reach the issue before the District Court, and if it enacted its intention into
law in a manner that abides with the Constitution, that is the end of the matter"); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that any law that is repugnant




section 8 and the Necessary and Proper Clause to create procedural rules or
rules that, "though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure," can rationally be classified as both.E° Thus, if the court
determines that Congress enacted a federal statute in accordance with its
constitutional authority, then the federal statute controls.2 ' In summary, when
the court determines that (1) a statute is sufficiently broad to cover the issue
of law at hand, and (2) Congress enacted the statute within its constitutional
powers by regulating procedural or arguably procedural matters, the federal
judge must apply the federal statute.22
If the source of the federal law stems from Congress as a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, the court must first assess whether the rule is sufficiently
broad to control the issue at hand. 3 In making this assessment, the Supreme
Court has instructed that courts should not impose an overly narrow
interpretation of the Federal Rules.24 Nevertheless, Supreme Court precedent
demonstrates that the Court does not always adhere to its own guidelines in
giving the rules a plain reading.25 Courts have the discretion to interpret a
20. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,472 (1965). The Hanna Court explained that Congress
has the power to create "rules governing the practice and pleading in [federal] courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." Id.
21. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 27, 32.
22. Id. at 27 ("[A] district court sitting in diversity must apply a federal statute that controls
the issue before the court and that represents a valid exercise of Congress' constitutional
powers.").
23. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) (noting that the first inquiry
is whether the scope of the Federal Rule is broad enough to directly collide with the state law).
24. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
25. Interestingly, the Supreme Court went to great lengths in Walker to set forth a "plain
meaning" test, which mandated that courts not take an overly narrow approach to the direct
collision analysis. Id. Nevertheless, the Court read Federal Rule 3 narrowly. Id. at 751
(limiting Rule 3's breadth to governing the date from which the Federal Rules' requirements
take effect and narrowly interpreting Rule 3 as not affecting state statutes of limitation). Most
recently, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), the Supreme Court
once again ignored Walker's mandate of broadly interpreting Federal Rules and Stewart's policy
of applying relevant federal procedural statutes by holding that "[flederal courts have interpreted
the Federal Rules ... with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies."
Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1637,
1643 (1998) (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7). The exact basis of the Court's
conclusion in Gasperini is hard to grasp. Accordingly, scholars have extensively criticized
Gasperini, and one scholar has concluded that although the Court had an excellent opportunity
to make a "meaningful contribution" to the Erie analysis, particularly in clarifying the Rules of
Decision Act and its decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S.
525 (1958), the Court instead "left the field about as murky as it was before." Id. at 1663; see
also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law:
Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 751 (1998) (recognizing that
2004]
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rule as being either broad enough to govern the issue before the court or,
alternatively, narrow enough to avoid a direct collision with the state rule or
law.26 Although the Supreme Court noted in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.7
that federal courts must give the Federal Rules their "plain meaning" when
determining their ability to sufficiently control the area of law at issue,28
judges still have different preferences when interpreting the Federal Rules.29
Thus, whether a rule applies in federal court largely depends on whether the
judge interprets the rule narrowly or broadly. 0
After determining that the scope of the Federal Rule encompasses the point
in dispute, the court must apply the rule if it represents "a valid exercise of
Congress' rulemaking authority.' In such a circumstance, Hanna v. Plumer32
clearly admonishes the federal judge to avoid the "relatively unguided" Erie
analysis 33 because the judge has already "been instructed to apply the Federal
Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and
the Court's recent Erie jurisprudence, including Gasperini, has not made the Erie doctrine any
easier to understand and has ultimately created more questions than answers). Despite such
widespread criticism, Gasperini's effect on the Court's Erie analysis remains to be seen. If the
Court continues down the path it took in Gasperini toward Walker's narrow application of Erie,
fewer instances of "direct collision" between state and federal law will likely occur, which will
result in a greater propensity of the Court to narrowly interpret federal laws so that the ideas and
policies behind state laws can be applied. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428 n.9.
26. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50.
27. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
28. Id. at 750 n.9.
29. Freer, supra note 25, at 1642 (noting that the "plain meaning" instruction "is not much
of an instruction because plain meaning is undoubtedly in the eye of the beholder").
30. Rhett Traband, An Erie Decision: Should Statutes Prohibiting the Pleading of Punitive
Damages Claims Be Applied in Federal Diversity Actions?, 26 STETSON L. REv. 225, 235-36
(1996). Although the Hanna decision allowed federal courts significant leeway in finding
conflict between state law and federal rules, the Walker Court seemed to indicate that courts
tend to construe laws to avoid such a direct conflict. Id. Because judges can construe the laws
to make them avoid or achieve collision, a thorough analysis will consider both possible
approaches.
31. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
32. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna v. Plumer remains perhaps the single most influential
decision in interpreting and applying the Erie doctrine. Ides, supra note 12, at 56 ("Next to
Erie, Hanna is the Court's most important decision in this realm, largely because it reestablishes
the primacy of legitimate federal law and provides a coherent method for assessing the
legitimacy of that law."). Courts rarely decide an Erie issue without citing to the "twin aims"
of Erie, which are described in footnote nine of the Hanna opinion. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468
n.9 (establishing the "twin aims of the Erie rule [as]: [ 1 ] discouragement of forum-shopping and
[2] the avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws").




Congress erred" in determining that the rule is consistent with both the Rules
Enabling Act and the U.S. Constitution.34
To determine whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is authorized by
congressional power, the federal court must make two inquiries. First, the
court must determine whether Congress's delegation to the Supreme Court of
the task of creating the Federal Rules under the Rules Enabling Act was a
delegation to regulate matters procedural or arguably procedural.35 Second,
the federal court must determine whether the Federal Rule infringes on any
substantive right. This second inquiry is required because, although the Rules
Enabling Act gives power to the Supreme Court to formulate procedural rules
of law to govern civil actions in the U.S. district courts, the text explicitly
states that such rules are not valid if they "abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.
3 6
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.," the Court broadly interpreted the caveat that
the Federal Rule must not infringe upon substantive rights. The Court held
that the initial inquiry in determining whether a Federal Rule complies with
the Rules Enabling Act is to decide whether the rule "really regulates
procedure."38 In making such an inquiry, the Court noted that substantive
rights should not be equated with "important" or "substantial" rights, thus
eliminating arguments that a federal court should categorize a rule as
substantive merely because of its importance to the lawsuit.39 Also, the
Sibbach Court suggested that a Federal Rule should be presumed valid under
the Rules Enabling Act because Congress's failure to take adverse action
against the Federal Rules at the time of their conception "indicates, at least,
that no transgression of legislative policy was found."'  Therefore, because
Congress had an opportunity to declare that a rule violates the Rules Enabling
Act during its adoption process and declined to do so gives weight to the




35. See id. at 472.
36. See The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) ("The Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the United States district courts ... and courts of appeals. Such rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.").
37. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 16.
41. Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1099, 1115, 1145 (2002) (explaining that the final step in
adopting a Federal Rule is when Congress is given a seven-month window to "enact legislation
20041
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In addition to Sibbach's generous interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act,
the Supreme Court has never found a procedural rule to have more than an
incidental effect on a substantive right, thanks in large part to the logistical
process by which the Federal Rules were created.42 Furthermore, the process
by which an amendment to an old rule or proposal for a new rule must
currently pass before taking effect also contributes to the validity of the
Federal Rules . 43 Accordingly, the Court has never struck down a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure as violating the Rules Enabling Act.44 Therefore, if the
source of federal law is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that (1) covers the
issue in dispute, and (2) does not exceed the power given to the Supreme
Court by Congress to create such rules in that it regulates arguably procedural
matters and does not have more than an incidental effect on substantive
rights,45 then the federal court must apply the Federal Rule.46
preventing the amendment [or Rule] from taking effect").
42. Harry Emmanuel Scozzaro, Jr., Notice Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Following Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.: Standing on the Shoulders ofConley and
Leatherman, 26 AM. J. TRIAADvOc. 385,417-18 (2002) (explaining that the Rules Enabling
Act formed an Advisory Committee to create the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the
committee proposed a set of rules that were then approved by the Supreme Court, and that
Congress eventually approved and adopted the Rules).
43. Struve, supra note 41, at 1103 (noting that amendments and proposals to the Federal
Rules must undergo at least seven stages of formal review from "five separate institutions: the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme Court, and Congress").
44. Id. at 1147 ("To the contrary, the Court has created a presumption of validity for the
Rules based on their transmission by the Court and on Congress's failure to enact legislation
to prevent them from taking effect.").
45. At least one scholar has argued that the Supreme Court's large role in creating the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be extended to interpreting the Federal Rules because,
unlike statutory interpretation, the Court does not have to defer to another branch to determine
legislative intent or to avoid infringing upon another branch's federal powers. See Joseph P.
Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 720, 720 (1988). Instead, the
Court should have full rein to interpret the Federal Rules as broadly as they deem necessary for
the rules to take the full effect and role intended by the Court. Id.; see also Karen Nelson
Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093, 1097 (1993) (stating that because Congress has "delegated to the
Court rulemaking power.., it is not inconsistent to imply the Court has greater power to
interpret Rules than it does to interpret statutes"). But see Struve, supra note 41, at 1102
(contending that "Congress's delegation of rulemaking authority should constrain, rather than
liberate, courts' interpretation of the Rules").




2. The Federal Law Derives from a Judge-Made Standard
Finally, in such instances where the federal law does not derive from the U.S.
Constitution or from Congress via a statute or rule, courts must determine
whether the federal law is a "judge-made rule" that can provide the applicable
rule of decision.47 If the source of federal law appears to be a judge-made
standard, the court must engage in an outcome-determination analysis" that
applies Hanna v. Plumer's "twin aims" of Erie.49
The Hanna Court established the "twin aims of the Erie rule [as]:
discouragement of forum-shopping and the avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws."50 Thus, the twin aims analysis determines (1)
whether there is such a difference between the state and federal laws as to cause
a litigant to forum shop, and (2) whether the difference between the federal and
state laws would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum state.5'
Federal courts must apply the test for outcome-determination from an ex ante
perspective by looking at the facts as they existed before the filing of the lawsuit
rather than at the time the issue is raised in litigation.52 If the federal law is not
outcome-determinative under the twin aims of Erie, then the court should apply
the federal law.
If the federal law appears to be outcome-determinative - for example, if it
is clear in advance that applying or failing to apply a rule will greatly favor one
47. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. Seven years after Erie, the Supreme Court decided Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, in which the Court announced that it intended Erie to ensure that in federal diversity
actions, "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so
far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in State court."
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (emphasis added). Thus, York derived from Erie an outcome-
determination test that favors vertical uniformity - that is, achieving the same results whether
in state or federal court - over horizontal uniformity, which favors attaining similar outcomes
in all federal courts. Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and
Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLtJM. L. REv. 969, 980 n.60 (1996) (noting that
horizontal uniformity among federal courts was sacrificed to achieve vertical uniformity among
state and federal courts under Erie). In other words, the Court recognized that in a federal
diversity action, the federal judge should apply the governing rules a state judge would so that
litigants do not receive a substantive advantage by strategically filing in one court instead of the
other.
49. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9.
50. Id. at 468.
51. Id.
52. Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1087, 1106 (1989) (stating
that "[i]nstead of assessing outcome determination at the point at which it is raised in
litigation - when it will always make a difference in outcome - it should be assessed ex ante,
as of the outset of litigation").
2004]
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of the parties - then the court must take another step to determine if an
affirmative countervailing federal interest exists.5 3 In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc.,' the Supreme Court recognized that when there are
"affirmative countervailing considerations at work," federal judges should
consider more than whether a different "outcome" would occur in state and
federal court.55 The Byrd Court balanced the "policy of uniform enforcement
of state-created rights and obligations" with the "federal policy against allowing
state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts."56 The
Court determined that federal courts should not apply the state rule allowing a
judge to decide the facts in particular cases in diversity actions to preserve the
federal constitutional preference for a jury trial. 7
The only affirmative countervailing interest recognized by the Supreme Court
thus far is the federal system's preference for a jury trial recognized in Byrd.58
Such preference stems from the Supremacy Clause, which requires judges to
apply the Seventh Amendment over state law.59 This balancing step is the
unguided portion of the Erie analysis becausejudges must make a policy choice
between federal and state laws.6° In essence, the judge balances whether the
policy preferring the same outcomes in federal and state courts outweighs the
affirmative countervailing interest of following the federal law.61 If the policy
of vertical uniformity outweighs the policy behind the federal law, then the
judge should apply the state law.62
53. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958).
54. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
55. Id. at 537.
56. Id. at 537-38.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 539.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 538 ("[The inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decision
of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective
that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and another way in the state
court.").
61. See id.
62. While the conventional Erie analysis subjects all cases involving judge-made federal
law to the balancing test, some commentators question this approach. According to one
alternative view, the balancing test does not apply if either the judge-made federal law is true
federal common law or the state practice is bound-up with substantive rights. See Steven S.
Gensler, The Relatively Underguided Erie Analysis (unpublished draft, on file with author).
Professor Gensler argues that courts mistakenly use the balancing test to identify state rules of
decision when the test's proper role is far more limited - to solve so-called Erie conflicts after
the court has determined that the state rule or practice is not a rule of decision. Id. In contrast,
if the case involves either true federal common law or a state rule of decision, then the case is




B. Erie Analysis Summary
In summary, the Erie analysis consists of three main branches - federal laws
stemming from (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) acts of Congress, and (3) judge-
made standards. The source of the federal law determines the path of analysis
down which to travel.
If the Constitution is the source of the law, the Supremacy Clause mandates
that the constitutional provision apply.63 If Congress provides the source of law
directly via a federal statute, then courts should apply the federal statute so long
as it covers the point in dispute and was enacted within Congress's
constitutional authority by covering matters that can be classified as procedural
or arguably procedural.64 Similarly, if Congress provides the source of law
indirectly through its delegated rule-making power, then courts should apply the
Federal Rule as long as it covers the issue in dispute and Congress has acted
within its constitutional powers by enacting a procedural rule in compliance with
the Rules Enabling Act.65
Finally, if the source of law stems from judge-made federal law, the court
must apply the twin aims of Erie under Hanna. Thus, the federal court should
defer to and apply state law if the disparity between the federal and state
standards would encourage forum shopping. If a federal affirmative
countervailing interest outweighs the preference for vertical uniformity,
however, the federal court should apply the federal standard even if the
difference in the standards causes litigants to forum shop.'
III. Certificates of Merit in Federal Court: A Contrast Among the Various
State Statutes
When assessing whether Erie requires federal courts to apply federal or state
pleading requirements in medical malpractice actions, a federal judge must
separately examine each state statute to determine the source of the federal law.
In other words, the judge must establish the origins of the federal standard that
arguably controls the issue at hand. The determining factor for whether to apply
the state statute in federal court depends on whether the state law conflicts with
a federal statute, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, or a federal judge-made
rule.67 Thus, after determining what the state statute prescribes, a federal judge
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
64. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
65. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988).
66. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 n.9 (1965); see also Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38.
67. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980).
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must further examine whether a Federal Rule or other federal law already
governs the particular area of law.
Many federal judges are presented with the opportunity to apply an Erie
analysis when examining state certificate of merit statutes. Such statutes require
plaintiffs "to file a certificate... that certifies, typically by way of an attached
expert report, that the claim is meritorious."6 8 As illustrated by the differences
among courts in applying certificate of merit statutes, the text and specific
requirements of each statute are fundamental in determining the source of the
federal law and, ultimately, in determining a state statute's applicability in
federal court under Erie.
A. Georgia and Florida: Federal Rule 8 Governs
More than one Georgia court has held strong to the proposition that Federal
Rule 8 is the controlling law for the "form of pleading in federal court."6 9 The
Georgia statute interpreted in these cases requires plaintiffs to file an affidavit
"of an expert competent to testify" with their complaint in a medical malpractice
suit.7" The Georgia statute also requires the filed affidavit to specifically assert
facts that support at least "one negligent act or omission claimed to exist."71
In Boone v. Knight,72 a Georgia district court noted that the Georgia statute
that requires the attachment of an expert affidavit to the pleadings "is codified
in the state's civil procedure code and is essentially a pleading requirement."73
The Boone court held that the statute essentially requires a pleading of evidence
by compelling a plaintiff to attach an expert's affidavit to the pleadings, an area
68. Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (And Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining
the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN.
ST. L. REv. 1077, 1111 (2004).
69. See, e.g., Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611 (S.D. Ga. 1990); see also Baird v.
Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (noting that an "expert affidavit which
requires specific allegations of negligence is in direct conflict with the notice pleading standard
of Federal Rule 8(a)").
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1998). The statute reads:
(a) In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against a
professional licensed by the State of Georgia ... or against any licensed health
care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or inaction of a health care
professional licensed by the State of Georgia... the plaintiff shall be required to
file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which
affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed
to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.
Id.
71. Id.
72. 131 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. Ga. 1990).




of law that Federal Rule 8 clearly governs.74 In reaching its decision to apply
Federal Rule 8, the Boone court cited various authorities that proclaim the
fundamental principles of Rule 8's liberal pleading requirements and that note
the Rule's deliberate difference from the detailed facts sometimes required in the
state pleading system.
75
Basing its decision on the rule from Hanna v. Plumer, a second Georgia
district court found that the Georgia statute was inapplicable in federal
proceedings under diversity jurisdiction. In Baird v. Celis,76 the court
considered that in Hanna, Federal Rule 4 would have governed the plaintiffs
service of process absent the Massachusetts statute covering service
requirements in state proceedings.77 The Baird court interpreted Hanna to hold
that
[wihen a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the
question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the
Federal Rule and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory
Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of
the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.78
Adhering to Hanna's determination that the "less restrictive Federal Rule [4]
regarding service [be] applied in the federal diversity case despite the
substantive policy behind the Massachusetts law," the Baird court similarly held
that the Georgia statute was not the governing law in federal court because
Federal Rule 8 "would govern a professional malpractice plaintiff's pleading
requirements in the absence of the state created affidavit requirement. '79 The
Baird court recognized that Georgia's affidavit requirement, like the state rule
in Hanna, "creates a higher standard for plaintiffs seeking to initiate a particular
type of action than the conflicting Federal Rule." 80 Much like the Supreme
Court in Hanna, the Baird court acknowledged that while the Georgia
legislature may have enacted the affidavit requirement with the substantive
74. Id.
75. Id. at 611-12 (stating that "[t]he pleading of evidence should be avoided insofar as it ...
violates the requirement of a short and plain statement" under Federal Rule 8 and that "[t]he
Erie doctrine has very little application to pleading in a federal court. A complaint is sufficient
if it meets the test of Rule 8(a), though it... fail[s] to set forth the detailed facts cherished in
the state system.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
76. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
77. Id. at 1360.
78. Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1361.
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policy of tort reform in mind, Federal Rule 8 still controls the pleading burden
on plaintiffs in federal court."1
In addition to the Georgia district court holdings, at least one Florida district
court has similarly refused to apply a heightened pleading state statute, finding
Federal Rule 8 to be sufficiently broad to control the pleading requirements in
federal court. In Braddock v. Orlando Regional Health Care System, Inc.,82 the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida interpreted a Florida statute
requiring an affidavit from a medical expert to accompany the plaintiffs
complaint as a procedural rule and held that Federal Rule 8 was the governing
source of the federal law. 3 Furthermore, the court held that the heightened
81. Id. On an interesting note, the Eleventh Circuit had the opportunity to interpret the
Georgia statute evaluated in Boone and Baird, but declined to do so. Brown v. Nichols, 8 F.3d
770, 774 (11 th Cir. 1993) ("We therefore need not reach the question of whether § 9-11-9.1
actually applies in federal court."); see also Harris, supra note 11, at 299 ("Rather than
attempting to resolve the question of whether the Georgia statute applied in federal court, the
Eleventh Circuit passed up an ideal opportunity to rule on Georgia's expert affidavit statute by
putting off the true question for another day."). In Brown v. Nichols, 8 F.3d 770 (11 th Cir.
1993), the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing a malpractice
petitioner's complaint for failing to attach an expert affidavit. Id. at 771-72. The Eleventh
Circuit found that if the Georgia statute does not apply in federal courts, then the district court
erred in dismissing the complaint because the complaint complied with Federal Rule 8. Id. at
773. Alternatively, the Eleventh Circuit found that even if the Georgia statute does apply in
federal court, the district court should have allowed the petitioner a "reasonable time" to file the
required affidavit rather than dismissing the claim with prejudice. Id. Because the lower court
should not have dismissed the plaintiff's petition under either scenario, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that it need not reach the question of whether the Georgia statute applies in federal
court. Id. at 774. The court recognized, however, the Supreme Court's recent emphasis "that
the Federal Rules 'do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases
his claim,"' reiterating the Eleventh Circuit's repeated emphasis on the liberal principles behind
the notice pleading standard that applies in federal court. Id. at 773 (quoting Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
82. 881 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
83. Id. at 584. see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2) (West 1997). The statute reads:
Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation
pursuant to s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the care or
treatment of the claimant; and
(b) Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant.
Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation
shall be provided by the claimant's submission of a verified written medical expert
opinion from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(5), at the time the notice
of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement shall corroborate
reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence.




pleading requirements of the Florida statute on a medical malpractice plaintiff
directly conflicted with Rule 8's requirement that a plaintiff plead only "a short
and plain statement of the claim."' Because a Federal Rule was both on point
and constitutionally instituted, the Florida district court correctly declined to
apply the twin aims from Hanna and instead accurately recognized that federal
courts must follow Congress's established rules for pleading.85
B. New Jersey and Colorado: No Direct Conflict Exists Between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Certificate of Merit Statutes
Contrary to lower court findings based on the respective Georgia and Florida
statutes, the Third and Tenth Circuits have refused to find a direct collision
between a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and the New Jersey or Colorado state
statutes. Accordingly, both the Third and Tenth Circuits have applied the state
statutes in federal court.'
In Chamberlain v. Giampapa,87 the Third Circuit considered New Jersey's
heightened pleading statute requiring the plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action to file an affidavit of a licensed physician within sixty days of the date of
the answer, and rejected Federal Rule 8 as the governing source of the federal
law.88 The court reasoned that because the New Jersey statute requires the
84. Braddock, 881 F. Supp. at 584 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2)).
85. See id.
86. Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws,
78 NEB. L. REv. 412, 429-33 (1999) (making an excellent analysis of decisions based on
Georgia, New Jersey, Colorado, and Florida statutes and considering the applicability of such
statutes to "professional malpractice claims" and "medical malpractice claims" in federal
courts).
87. 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 160 ('The affidavit of merit statute has no effect on what is included in the
pleadings of a case .... The required affidavit is not a pleading, is not filed until after the
pleadings are closed, and does not contain a statement of the factual basis for the claim."); see
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000). The statute reads:
In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property
damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed
person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following
the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each
defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a
reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in
the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside
acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. The
court may grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file
the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause. The person
executing the affidavit shall be licensed in this or any other state; have particular
expertise in the general area or specialty involved in the action, as evidenced by
board certification or by devotion of the person's practice substantially to the
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plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit sixty days after the defendant's answer, the
pleading requirements remain unaffected, and thus, there is no direct collision
between the affidavit of merit statute and Rule 8.89
The court further stated that the purpose of the New Jersey statute is not to
"give notice of the plaintiff's claim," but to ensure that illegitimate medical
malpractice claims will be "terminated at an early stage in the proceedings."'9
Such reasoning, however, ignores the structure of notice pleading and the
purpose of Federal Rules 12 and 56 in the federal system, which are designed
to eradicate unmeritorious claims early in the litigation process.9 Furthermore,
the Third Circuit reasoned that Federal Rule 9' was not triggered because the
New Jersey statute does not require the affidavit to include any statement of
facts. Thus, the court concluded that the statute does not contain a heightened
pleading requirement.93 Because the Third Circuit noted that the New Jersey
statute does not compromise any of the policy choices set forth in Rules 8 and
9, the court concluded that the statute could coexist with the Federal Rules.94
Having rendered such a narrow reading of Federal Rules 8 and 9, the court
emphasized that failing to apply the New Jersey statute in federal courts would
result in forum shopping and an inequitable administration of the laws.
Additionally, the court rejected the notion that any affirmative countervailing
federal interest might outweigh the state policy behind the affidavit of merit
statute.95
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion regarding the applicability of
a state statute in federal court in evaluating the Colorado heightened pleading
general area or specialty involved in the action for a period of at least five years.
The person shall have no financial interest in the outcome of the case under
review, but this prohibition shall not exclude the person from being an expert
witness in the case.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27.
89. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160.
90. Id.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 12, 56 (setting forth vehicles for dismissal of the suit and the summary
judgment standard to be applied by courts, respectively). By instituting additional policies in
an attempt to eradicate illegitimate lawsuits early in the litigation process, courts infringe upon
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules have already created the procedural
rules for federal courts to abide by and, in doing so, have already taken into consideration the
desired level of pleading requirements and have provided courts with an opportunity to dismiss
an illegitimate lawsuit early in the process via the appropriate summary judgment procedure.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
92. FED. R. CIv. P. 9 (mandating a heightened pleading standard for fraud and mistake by
requiring plaintiffs to plead such allegations with particularity).
93. See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160.
94. Id.




standard in Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp.' In 1996, the Tenth
Circuit narrowly interpreted the Colorado medical malpractice pleading statute9
96. 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1996).
97. At the time that Trierweiler was decided, the pertinent part of the statute read:
(1) In every action for damages or indemnity based upon the alleged
professional negligence of a licensed professional, the plaintiff's or complainant's
attorney shall file with the court a certificate of review, for each licensed
professional named as a party, as specified in subsection (3) of this section, within
sixty days after the service of the complaint, counterclaim, or cross claim against
such licensed professional unless the court determines that a longer period is
necessary for good cause shown.
(3) (a) A certificate of review shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff
or complainant declaring:
(I) That the attorney has consulted a person who has expertise in the area of
the alleged negligent conduct; and
(II) That the professional ... has reviewed the known facts relevant to the
allegations of negligent conduct and, based on such facts, has concluded that the
filing of the claim, counterclaim, or cross claim does not lack substantial
justification within the meaning of section 13-17-102(4).
(4) The failure to file a certificate of review in accordance with this section
shall result in the dismissal of the complaint, counterclaim, or cross claim.
Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1538 n.9 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602). The statute currently
reads:
(1) (a) In every action for damages or indemnity based upon the alleged
professional negligence of an acupuncturist ... or a licensed professional, the
plaintiff's or complainant's attorney shall file with the court a certificate of review
for each acupuncturist or licensed professional named as a party, as specified in
subsection (3) of this section, within sixty days after the service of the complaint,
counterclaim, or cross claim against such person unless the court determines that
a longer period is necessary for good cause shown.
(b) A certificate of review shall be filed with respect to every action described
in paragraph (a) of this subsection ....
(2) In the event of failure to file a certificate of review in accordance with this
section... the defense may move the court for an order requiring filing of such
a certificate. The court shall give priority to deciding such a motion, and in no
event shall the court allow the case to be set for trial without a decision on such
motion.
(3) (a) A certificate of review shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff
or complainant declaring:
(I) That the attorney has consulted a person who has expertise in the area of
the alleged negligent conduct; and
(II) That the professional who has been consulted pursuant to subparagraph (I)
of this paragraph (a) has reviewed the known facts, including such records,
documents, and other materials which the professional has found to be relevant to
the allegations of negligent conduct and, based on the review of such facts, has
concluded that the filing of the claim, counterclaim, or cross claim does not lack
substantial justification ....
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requiring a plaintiff s attorney to certify within sixty days of filing that an expert
found the client's claims to have "substantial justification. ' '98 Because the
Colorado statute heightened the requirements of attorney certification and did
not appear on its face to affect the plaintiffs burden of pleading, the court
completely failed to address either Federal Rule 8 or 9, instead regarding Federal
Rule 11 as the source of the competing federal law.99 Under Rule 11, attorneys
must sign written documents filed in federal court to signify that the attorney,
after a reasonable inquiry, believes that the filing is both supported and
meritorious and is not submitted for an improper purpose.1°° The court
recognized a "superficial similarity" between Rule 11 and the state statute1°1 but
determined that the two could coexist, "each controlling its own intended sphere
of coverage without conflict."' °2 The court differentiated the two, noting that
while the Colorado statute penalizes the party who fails to comply with the
heightened pleading requirement, Rule 11 is designed to sanction the attorney
who violates the rule.103 Further, the court recognized that the Colorado statute
operates not only to eliminate frivolous claims, but also "'to expedite the
litigation process in [such] cases' by imposing a 60-day time limit."' "°4 The court
ignored, however, that these same interests are advanced through newly enacted
Federal Rule 26, which requires litigants to make certain disclosures at the initial
phase of the proceedings without a discovery request from the adverse party,'1 5
(4) The failure to file a certificate of review in accordance with this section
shall result in the dismissal of the complaint, counterclaim, or cross claim.
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2003).
98. Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1537-38.
99. Id. at 1540; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 11. Federal Rule 11 reads:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances, -
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose...;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (emphasis added).
100. FED. R. CwV. P. 11.
101. Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540.
102. Id. (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Martinez v. Baldi, 842 P.2d 245, 251 (Colo. 1992)).




and by Federal Rule 56, which provides litigants with an opportunity to
eradicate frivolous or meritless lawsuits at an early stage of the proceedings."
The Trierweiler court justified its decision to apply the Colorado statute in
federal court by reasoning that the statute "vindicates substantive interests of
Colorado not covered by Rule ll."" Accordingly, and despite their
similarities, the court failed to find a "direct collision" between Rule 11 and the
state statute.108 Because the court did not find a collision between the two, it
held that: (1) a plaintiff seeking to litigate a medical malpractice claim would be
more inclined to forum shop because of the obvious advantage of filing in a
court system that does not require a "certificate of review hurdle;"'" (2) the
failure to apply the state statute in federal court would result in a penalty being
inequitably bestowed upon plaintiffs in state court "but not on those in federal
court;"' O and (3) the state policy reflected in the statute was "bound up with
[state-created] rights and obligations." 1
C. Illinois: Disharmony Resounds Regarding Federal Rule 8
The disparities of the Erie application to certificate of merit statutes extend
beyond interstate federal courts to the district courts within a single state. 112 In
1985, the Illinois legislature amended the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure to
include section 2-622,"3 which requires plaintiffs in a medical liability action
106. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 56.
107. Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1541 ("A plaintiff alleging professional negligence is likely to seek a forum
without the certificate of review hurdle either to avoid the extra cost, to give himself or herself
more time to build a meritorious case, or to increase the settlement value of his or her
claims .... ) (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958)).
112. See Robert P. Vogt, Must Med-Mal Plaintiffs File Section 2-622 Certificates of Merit
in Federal Court?, 91 ILL. B.J. 72 (2003).
113. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (1998). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) In any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff
seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing
art malpractice, the plaintiffs attorney or the plaintiff, if the plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, shall file an affidavit, attached to the original and all copies of the
complaint, declaring one of the following:
1. That the affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a
health professional who the afflant reasonably believes: (i) is knowledgeable in the
relevant issues involved in the particular action; (ii) practices or has practiced
within the last 6 years or teaches or has taught within the last 6 years in the same
area of health care or medicine that is at issue in the particular action; and (iii) is
qualified by experience or demonstrated competence in the subject of the case;
that the reviewing health professional has determined in a written report, after a
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in Illinois to file a certificate of merit from a medical expert validating the basis
for bringing the suit with their petition." 4 Although the Illinois statute was
enacted over fifteen years ago, federal district courts still differ on the issue of
whether the statute applies to a federal diversity action for medical
malpractice." 5 Illinois federal judges at the district level have adopted at least
three conflicting methods of applying the statute in federal court.
116
Most Illinois federal district courts have applied the state statute at both the
state and federal level.' By construing the nature of the expert affidavit as an
"attachment" rather than a pleading standard, these courts found Federal Rule
8 inapplicable." 8 Accordingly, these courts moved directly into an analysis
under the twin aims of Erie and concluded that applying the statute in state
court, but not in federal court, would lead to both forum shopping and
discrimination among litigants."
9
Still, another set of federal judges from the district courts of Illinois have
declined to apply the Illinois statute to federal diversity actions because they
review of the medical record and other relevant material involved in the particular
action that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of such action;
and that the affiant has concluded on the basis of the reviewing health
professional's review and consultation that there is a reasonable and meritorious
cause for filing of such action.... [T]he affidavit must identify the profession of
the reviewing health professional. A copy of the written report, clearly identifying
the plaintiff and the reasons for the reviewing health professional's determination
that a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action exists, must be
attached to the affidavit. The report shall include the name and the address of the
health professional.
Id.
114. Vogt, supra note 112, at 72. Like the Georgia statute, Illinois's affidavit requirement
is codified in the state's civil procedure code, which furthers the argument that the statute
governs as a matter of procedure, not substance. See also Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609,
611 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
115. Vogt, supra note 112, at 75 n.5.
116. Id. at 72. Robert P. Vogt contends that while the Seventh Circuit has not "expressly
ruled that section 2-622 applies to medical malpractice claims filed in Illinois federal district
courts, the court has issued two opinions suggesting as much." Id. at 73 (suggesting that Hines
v. Elkhart General Hospital, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979), and Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605
(7th Cir. 2000), both require the application of section 2-622 in federal court).
117. Vogt, supra note 112, at 73.
118. Id.; see Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Kishwaukee Valley Med. Group, No. 86 C
1483, 1986 WL 11381, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1986) (explaining that section 2-622 does not
collide with either Federal Rule 8 or 9 because the attachment of an affidavit does not enlarge
the pleading requirements).




have recognized the Illinois statute as "a mere 'state pleading rule.'". 0 Further,
thesejudges acknowledged the direct conflict between the statute and the liberal
pleading standards mandated by Federal Rule 8.121 As one judge explained, "I
will not dismiss a state claim made in federal court for failure to comply with a
state pleading rule.'
' 22
Finally, at least two federal district court judges in Illinois have ruled both
ways regarding the statute's applicability in federal court. 123 Both judges
initially found the Illinois state statute applicable in federal court. In subsequent
cases, however, both judges refused to dismiss a plaintiff s claim for failure to
comply with the state pleading rule.'24
Although the courts' disharmony in applying additional pleading
requirements in federal court based on state medical malpractice statutes may
initially appear odd, such disparities are logical and explicable because, as
illustrated by New Jersey, Colorado, Georgia, and Florida, judges rely on
variations in the state statutes to justify decisions for or against applying the
heightened pleading requirements in federal court. Regardless of the statutory
variations in timing or other technical requirements, however, any attempt to
heighten the level of pleading required in federal court directly contravenes the
notice pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule 8. Nevertheless, because
courts look to the variations within the statutory requirements, a careful
examination of individual state statutes is important in determining whether
expert affidavit requirements directly conflict with federal law and, therefore,
should not be applied in federal court.
Still, as illustrated by Illinois, even courts applying the same state statute can
disagree about the appropriate application of state or federal law. The
disagreement among the Illinois courts illustrates the difficulty of forecasting
whether federal courts will apply state certificate of merit statutes. Federal
judges who read Rule 8 narrowly will determine that it can peacefully coexist
with expert affidavit requirements and, therefore, will apply the state certificate
of merit statute. 25 Judges who read Rule 8 according to its plain meaning as
directed by the Supreme Court in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,126 however, will
find a direct collision between Rule 8 and the additional affidavit requirements
120. Id. at 73 (quoting Threlkeld v. White Castle Sys., 127 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. 111.
2001)).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Threlkeld, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 991).
123. Id. at 75 n.19.
124. Id. (criticizing the judges for their failure to explain their opinion on the issue and for
their avoidance of mentioning their own past rulings).
125. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000).
126. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980).
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because of the liberal notice pleading standard mandated by Rule 8.127 Thus,
federal courts must consider the specific text of the state statute coupled with the
scope of Rule 8 as applied in federal court in the quest to determine whether a
state's certificate of merit requirements apply in federal court.
IV. The Scope of Federal Rule 8
A. Just How Broad Is Federal Rule 8?
A close examination of Federal Rule 8 reveals that the Rule is sufficiently
broad to cover all pleading requirements in federal court. 128 Furthermore,
because Rule 8 already prescribes federal pleading standards, the Rule cannot
peacefully coexist with state certificate of merit statutes, which impose
additional expert affidavit pleading requirements.
Federal Rule 8 requires mere notice pleading. As one scholar recently
explained, "a pleading is to do little more than indicate the type of litigation that
is involved."' 2 9 Such modem federal pleading standards were developed in
response to the disdain for the detailed pleading requirements under the common
law.
130
Common law pleadings were notoriously "slow, expensive, and unworkable"
because litigants were forced through various stages of pleading that courts
ultimately relied upon to determine the outcome of the suit.'3' Thus, by the mid-
1800s, many states had adopted the Field Code as an attempt to reform
pleadings. 32 In doing so, the Field Code moved the facts of the case to the
127. E.g., Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609,611 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
128. See Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About
Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REv. 971, 1021-25 (2005) (analyzing Rule 8's
history and purpose in concluding that Rule 8 is broad enough to cover all pleading
requirements in federal court unless Rule 9 specifically provides otherwise).
129. Scozzaro, supra note 42, at 416-17; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433, 451 (1986)
("Whatever the earlier function of pleadings, the stated modem justification is limited to
notice.").
130. Robert B. Millner, Notice Pleading Today, LrITG., Spring 1992, at 33, 33 (noting that
before 1938, the common law requirements of detailed pleading meant that "[f]ailure to plead
the magic words could mean prompt dismissal .... This process, known as fact pleading, was
rife with technicalities and traps for the unwary, and litigation pleading was as much a game as
a quest for justice.").
131. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Thx. L. REv. 551, 554-55 (2002)
(quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 467 (5th ed. 1994)). For a more
extensive analysis of the history behind modem federal pleading standards, see Penrose &
Caldwell, supra note 128, at 1000-03.




forefront of the pleadings instead of focusing on the issues as required by
common law.133 Rather than replacing common law pleadings with a more
efficient system, however, the Field Code produced more undesired results as
disputes escalated over whether allegations were evidence, facts, or conclusions
of law. 1"4 Thus, the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure carefully
crafted Rule 8 with the deficiencies of the previous systems in mind.'35 The
framers drafted Rule 8(a)(2), in particular, to avoid the requirement of a pleading
of the facts.
136
Only a few years after the federal courts adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Judge Charles E. Clark, one of the principal drafters of the Federal
Rules,'37 articulated the meaning of Rule 8 in his majority opinion in Dioguardi
v. Durning.138 Judge Clark explained, "Under the new rules of civil procedure,
there is no pleading requirement of stating 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action,' but only that there be 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ... ,,,13' In refusing to uphold a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on an "obviously home
drawn" and inartistic complaint, Judge Clark and the Second Circuit paved one
of the first stepping stones on the pathway to recognizing a requirement of mere
notice pleading under the modem Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
If any doubts of the validity of the new liberal pleading requirements under
the Federal Rules remained, these doubts were cast away years ago in the 1957
decision of Conley v. Gibson,'4' when the U.S. Supreme Court displayed its
overwhelming support for the "notice pleading" standard behind Rule 8.142 If




136. Marcus, supra note 129, at 439 (stating that "Rule 8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to avoid
use of the charged phrases 'fact,' 'conclusion,' and 'cause of action"').
137. Scozzaro, supra note 42, at 423. Scozzaro's article does an excellent job of tracing the
judicial interpretations of Federal Rule 8(a)(2) and, in doing so, particularly analyzes the effect
of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002) on the notice pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Scozzaro, supra note 42, at 423-31.
138. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). While Justice Clark initially desired the "abolition of all
pleading motions," he settled for Federal Rule 8, which the drafters carefully wrote to avoid
pleadings of fact and issue by requiring only a "short and plain statement of [the] claim."
Fairman, supra note 131, at 556 (quoting FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(a)).
139. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
140. Id. at 774.
141. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
142. See id. at 47-48.
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Rule 8, then Conley v. Gibson is the cornerstone of the Court's notice pleading
jurisprudence. Just a few years before the Court's ruling in Conley, a group of
federal judges sought to resurrect a form of code pleading to require plaintiffs
to plead at least a minimum amount of facts in support of their cause of action.
Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules' refusal to adopt the
proposal to change Rule 8 coupled with the Conley decision seemed to dispose
of any lingering notions to revive code pleadings.'43
In Conley, the Court rejected the argument that a federal court should dismiss
a complaint for failure to state specific facts to support its allegations.'" The
Court declared that its "decisive answer" to the dismissal argument was that "the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim."'45  In addition to noting that the
"illustrative forms" attached to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
demonstrate that Rule 8 requires only a mere "short and plain statement of the
claim," the Conley Court also recognized that "simplified 'notice pleading' is
made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules."' 46 Finally, the Court rejected the idea that
the Federal Rules perceive pleading as a skillful game in which a single mistake
by counsel could be detrimental to the outcome of the case, and instead adopted
the approach that the purpose of pleading is "to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits."147 The Court's holding and analysis of Federal Rule 8 in Conley has
remained undisturbed for many years and is cited routinely for its proposition
that Rule 8 means precisely what it says when it requires only "a short and plain
statement of the claim.'
148
The U.S. Supreme Court relied on Conley's interpretation of Federal Rule 8
in Leathernan v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit. 49 In 1993, the Leatherman Court determined whether federal courts may
143. Id.
144. Id. at 47.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 47-48. In footnote 9, the Court gave the following list of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that enable the notice pleading standard through discovery and other pretrial
procedures:
See e.g., Rule 12(e) (motion for a more definite statement); Rule 12(f) (motion to
strike portions of the pleading); Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the
pleadings); Rule 16 (pre-trial procedure and formulation of issue); Rules 26-37
(depositions and discovery); Rule 56 (motion for summary judgment); Rule 15
(right to amend).
Id. at 48 n.9.
147. Id. at 48.
148. Id. at 47.
149. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). The Leatherman Court cited Conley v. Gibson as saying that




apply a "heightened pleading standard" that is more rigorous and stringent than
the normal requirements of Rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal
liability. I 0 The Supreme Court reviewed a case in which the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss a
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it failed to meet the
"heightened pleading standard."'' After examining the Fifth Circuit's decision,
the Supreme Court declared that the "heightened pleading standard" was clearly
"a more demanding rule for pleading a complaint under § 1983 than for pleading
other kinds of claims for relief."' 52 Although the respondents argued that a mere
notice pleading requirement would cause municipalities to devote significant
amounts of time and money to discovery in each § 1983 case, thereby voiding
their immunity from suit and disturbing their municipal duties, 5 3 the Court held
that harmonizing the "heightened pleading standard" required by the Fifth
Circuit with the "liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules
[of Civil Procedure]" was not feasible. 154
Furthermore, the Court noted that the drafters of the Federal Rules created
Federal Rule 9(b) to specifically address instances in which a heightened
pleading standard was required and that the drafters of Rule 9(b) had limited
those instances to fraud and mistake. 55 Although the Court acknowledged that
if Rule 9(b) were written today, the drafters might have included civil rights
claims against municipalities in the list of claims that plaintiffs are required to
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules
require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
Id. at 168 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
150. Id. at 164 (stating the issue before the court as whether a federal court could apply a
"heightened pleading requirement" in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
151. Id. at 165.
152. Id. at 167. The Leatherman Court noted that the rule of heightened pleading
requirements for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Elliot v.
Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985), by stating:
In cases against governmental officials involving the likely defense of immunity
we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff's complaint state with
factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes
why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity.
Id. (citing Elliot, 751 F.2d at 1473).
153. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166.
154. Id. at 168.
155. Id. The Leatherman Court acknowledged that the Federal Rules address the need for
a heightened particularity in the pleading of certain actions, but that civil rights actions alleging
municipal liability under § 1983 do not fall within such a category. Id.
2004] 1001
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
plead with particularity, the Court correctly determined that it lacked the
appropriate power to judicially engraft § 1983 claims into Rule 9(b). 6 The
Court recognized that only by the proper process of amending Rule 9(b) can a
federal court apply a heightened pleading requirement to a § 1983 claim and that
until such an amendment is made, municipalities will have to rely on "summary
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims." 157
Before the Supreme Court's holding in Leathennan, Professor Richard
Marcus, in his article entitled "The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure," identified three areas of law where lower courts had
been more stringent in requiring fact pleading - securities fraud, conspiracy,
and civil rights cases. 158 Professor Marcus contended that the common thread
between these three areas of law is twofold: (1) each area of law has undergone
a significant increase in litigation since the Federal Rules' inception in 1938;
and (2) each of the three areas of law involves "the potential abuse of litigation
because they often involve outwardly innocent or admitted behavior that can.
. . result in very substantial liability."'59 Medical malpractice suits might
logically fit into Professor Marcus's three areas because of the recent growth of
medical liability actions coupled with their potential abuse of litigation. The
bottom line, however, as recently recognized by the Supreme Court, remains that
"[a] requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that 'must
be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation.""6
Therefore, while allowing a heightened pleading standard to curb the growth
of medical malpractice litigation and further the nationwide tort reform
movement may seem proper from a policy standpoint, 6' federal courts may not
make this decision from the bench without engaging in judicial legislation. 62
156. Id.
157. Id. at 168-69.
158. Marcus, supra note 129, at 447. The Supreme Court, however, struck down the notion
that civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 require a higher standard of
pleading. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164.
159. Marcus, supra note 129, at 447-50.
160. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Leatherman, 507
U.S. at 168) (emphasis added).
161. Bush, State of the Union Address, supra note 1 (urging Congress to pass "medical
liability reform" because "[n]o one has ever been healed by a frivolous lawsuit").
162. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995)
(recognizing the Supreme Court's "obligation to avoid judicial legislation"); City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 397 (1991) (describing judicial legislation as a
"bold and disturbing act"); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340
(1897) (noting that the Supreme Court "cannot and ought not" engage in judicial legislation by




The Constitution clearly sets forth that the legislative branch has sole authority
to make new laws and amend old laws. 63 Thus, according to Leatherman, even
if the Supreme Court determines that a form of heightened pleading is necessary
in an area of law other than those provided for in Federal Rule 9,16" the
appropriate judicial remedy is to change the Federal Rules through the proper
amendment process. 161
B. Swierkiewicz: The Breadth of Federal Rule 8 Is Affirmed
In 2002, the Court further endorsed the minimal pleading standards
prescribed by Federal Rule 8 in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.66 In Swierkiewicz,
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that an employment discrimination
plaintiff is required to plead specific facts to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. 67 The petitioner had filed an action alleging that his employer
improperly terminated him based on his age and national origin in direct
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.168 The district court dismissed the
petitioner's complaint for failing to allege a prima facie case because the
petition did not properly state circumstances that created an inference of
discrimination. 169  After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to "resolve a split
among the Courts of Appeals concerning the proper pleading standard for
employment discrimination cases."17
The Supreme Court determined that the court of appeals improperly
construed evidentiary requirements as pleading standards, and therefore,
erroneously required the petitioner to allege the following in his complaint: (1)
that he was part of a "protected group," (2) that he was qualified for the job at
issue, (3) that he was the recipient of an "adverse employment action," and (4)
any circumstances or facts supporting an "inference of discrimination.'' 7 The
163. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
164. FED. R. CIv. P. 9.
165. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
166. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
167. Id. at 508.
168. Id. at 509.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 509-10.
171. Id. at 510. Although the Supreme Court had indeed articulated the four factors relied
upon by the Second Circuit, the Court noted that these factors were a formulation for the
petitioner's evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. Id. Thus, the appellate court
incorrectly applied evidentiary factors handed down in McDonnell Douglas and, in doing so,
incorrectly dismissed petitioner's complaint. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
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Court clarified that it had never indicated that the evidentiary factors required
in proving a prima facie case also apply in determining the level of pleading
required for a plaintiff to prevail over a defendant's motion to dismiss.'72
Furthermore, the Court reestablished the principle that when a federal court
reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, its task is not to determine whether the
plaintiff's action will ultimately succeed, but rather whether the court should
afford the petitioner an opportunity to offer evidence to support the allegations
made in the complaint.'
The Swierkiewicz Court found that imposing a heightened pleading standard
in employment discrimination cases conflicted with Federal Rule 8." The
Court noted that the Federal Rules only require a petitioner to give the defendant
"fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."'75 Consistent with its reasoning in Conley and Leatherman, the Supreme
Court again acknowledged the existence of other measures within the Federal
Rules that are specifically designed to clarify disputed facts and to eliminate
unmeritorious claims. 76 In acknowledging that Rule 8 applies to nearly all civil
actions, the Court distinguished the limited cases of fraud and mistake, which
require a heightened pleading standard under Rule 9.177 The Court concluded
that because Rule 9 makes no mention of employment discrimination lawsuits,
these complaints "must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a)."' 178
Finally, the Swierkiewicz Court rejected the policy arguments raised by the
respondent contending that allowing employment discrimination suits without
substantiated facts would unduly burden the court system and encourage
employees to bring unmeritorious suits. 79 The Court denied this argument,
regardless of its practicality, because the Federal Rules do not require a
heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits. 180 Relying
on its instruction of a legislative remedy in Leatherman, the Court reiterated that
a requirement of greater specificity for a particular type of pleading can only be
achieved by amending the Federal Rules and not by judicial determination.' 8'
172. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
173. Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
174. ld. at 512.
175. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
176. Id. The Court stated that notice pleadings are supported by "liberal discovery rules and
summary judgment motions." Id. These provisions provide both parties with an adequate
opportunity to define the factual issues and to eliminate any invalid claims before a trial ever
takes place. See id. at 512-13.
177. Id. at 513.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 514.





Thus, the Supreme Court yet again strictly adhered to Rule 8's notice pleading
requirement and rejected the notion of applying a heightened pleading standard.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence announced in Conley, Leatherman, and
Swierkiewicz strongly supports the principle that Federal Rule 8 is the
controlling standard for pleading requirements in federal court. These decisions
weigh heavily in favor of determining that a state statute or policy requiring a
heightened pleading standard in federal court will directly collide with Rule 8.182
Furthermore, the Court stated that although Rule 9 has carefully carved
exceptions in invoking a higher pleading standard for actions of fraud or
mistake, in the absence of such actions, Rule 8 is the controlling provision to be
applied in federal court and requires only "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
83
V. Applying Erie to Oklahoma's Health Care Act
Oklahoma federal courts will inevitably be faced with the decision of whether
to apply Oklahoma's newly created Health Care Act to the pleadings of a
medical malpractice action filed in a federal diversity suit or whether Federal
Rule 8 is sufficiently broad to cover all pleading requirements.'"
182. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993) (finding it impossible to harmonize a heightened pleading standard with the
notice pleading standard enacted by Rule 8(a)(2)).
183. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2)).
184. See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-1708.1E (Supp. 2003). The new measure reads as follows:
§ 1-1708.1E [Affordable Access to Health Care Act]
1. In any medical liability action, except as provided in subsection B of this
section, the plaintiff shall attach to the petition an affidavit attesting that:
a. the plaintiff has consulted and reviewed the facts of the claim with a
qualified expert,
b. the plaintiff has obtained a written opinion from a qualified expert that
clearly identifies the plaintiff and includes the expert's determination that, based
upon a review of the available medical records, facts or other relevant material, a
reasonable interpretation of the facts supports a finding that the acts or omissions
of the health care provider against whom the action is brought constituted
professional negligence, and
c. on the basis of the qualified expert's review and consultation, the plaintiff
has concluded that the claim is meritorious and based on good cause.
2. If a medical liability action is filed:
a. without an affidavit being attached to the petition, as required in paragraph
1 of this subsection, and
b. no extension of time is subsequently granted by the court, pursuant to
subsection B of this section, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss
the action without prejudice to its refiling.
3. The written opinion from the qualified expert shall state the acts or
omissions of the defendant(s) that the expert then believes constituted professional
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The Health Care Act requires the plaintiff to attach an expert affidavit with
and in addition to the complaint as part of the pleadings of a medical liability
action. In the affidavit, the plaintiff must attest that she has reviewed the facts
of the claim with an expert and has obtained the expert's written opinion that,
based on those facts, the plaintiff has a legitimate claim for professional
negligence that is both "meritorious" and "based on good cause."'' 85 If the
plaintiff files a medical malpractice action without an affidavit attached to the
pleadings, the court may grant a ninety-day extension for the plaintiff to file
such affidavit, upon the plaintiffs request and after a showing of good cause. 18
6
If the plaintiff files the action without an affidavit and the court does not grant
an extension, the court shall dismiss the action without prejudice upon the
defendant's motion.1
87
In contrast, Federal Rule 8, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz, requires only "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."' 88 Although
Federal Rule 9 sets forth the instances in which the federal courts require
plaintiffs to plead certain actions with particularity, Rule 9 does not impose such
heightened pleading requirements on medical liability actions.'89
A. The Health Care Act Attempts to Heighten the Level of Pleading Already
Covered by Federal Rule 8
Because the Health Care Act and Federal Rule 8 prescribe different pleading
requirements, federal courts should engage in an Erie analysis to determine
whether the state or federal standard should apply in diversity actions. Given
that Rule 8 has governed pleading requirements since the inception of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, a Federal Rule enacted by Congress
is clearly the source of the federal law for pleading requirements in federal
court.itg Therefore, the federal courts should begin by examining Rule 8 to see
if its scope governs all pleading requirements in federal court or whether other
negligence and shall include reasons explaining why the acts or omissions
constituted professional negligence. The written opinion from the qualified expert
shall not be admissible at trial for any purpose nor shall any inquiry be permitted





188. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring that in all claims "of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity") (emphasis added).
190. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74




pleading requirements can peacefully coexist, thereby avoiding a direct collision
with Rule 8.191
When deciding whether a possible collision exists between a state law and a
Federal Rule, the Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to give the
Federal Rules their "plain meaning."192 In recently interpreting a Federal Rule,
the Court noted that its task was to "apply the text, not to improve upon it.
1 93
The Supreme Court articulated the plain meaning of Rule 8 in Conley v. Gibson
by stating that "all the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim'
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."'" The Court in Leatherman confirmed this plain
meaning approach by reiterating the "notice pleading" requirements of Rule 8
and noting that a heightened pleading requirement in cases other than fraud or
mistake is "impossible to square" with such a notice pleading standard.'9 5
Finally, the Court's most recent pronouncement in Swierkiewicz, namely that
Rule 8's simplistic standards of pleading apply to all civil actions with limited
exceptions under Rule 9, suggests a direct collision between Rule 8 and the new
Oklahoma statute."9
Thus, considering the Supreme Court's jurisprudence requiring Rule 8 to
govern the content of pleadings in federal court, Oklahoma's Health Care Act,
which creates additional pleading requirements for plaintiffs in medical
malpractice suits, directly collides with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
Hanna v. Plumer clearly holds that where the issue before the court is covered
by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and is within the confines of the Rules
Enabling Act and the U.S. Constitution, the federal court must apply the Federal
Rule.
197
Furthermore, federal courts in Georgia have applied Rule 8 rather than
Georgia's state certificate of merit statute, which is similar to Oklahoma's
Health Care Act.19 Both Georgia and Oklahoma's certificate of merit statutes
191. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987); Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980).
192. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
193. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (interpreting
liability for a violation of Federal Rule 11 to extend only to the individual attorney, not the
entire law firm).
194. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
195. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993).
196. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,513 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court
has refused to extend such exceptions of a heightened pleading standard to other contexts).
197. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
198. Both the Baird and the Boone courts found that the Georgia statute requiring plaintiffs
to attach expert affidavits to pleadings conflicts with Federal Rule 8. See Baird v. Celis, 41 F.
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require medical malpractice plaintiffs to attach expert affidavits to their
pleadings.' 99 As recognized by the Boone court, the affidavit requirement
essentially heightens the requisite level of pleading from that required under
Rule 8.20° Because Rule 8 governs federal court pleading standards, any
requirement beyond "a short and plain statement of the claim" directly
contravenes the intentions of the Federal Rules unless such requirement falls
within the specific exceptions for fraud and mistake created by Rule 9.201 The
Boone court held that a federal court must consider the sufficiency of a
complaint under Rule 8 rather than under the Georgia statute, and concluded that
"[s]ince there is a special Federal Rule governing the form of pleading in federal
court, that rule controls over any contrary provision of state law. ' 2°
Also analogous to the Georgia statute, the affidavit required under
Oklahoma's Health Care Act must be based upon a "written opinion from a
qualified expert that shall state the acts or omissions of the defendant(s) that the
expert then believes constituted professional negligence."2 °3 Although the
Georgia statute requires the actual affidavit to assert at least one act of
negligence and the facts behind such a claim, 2°4 the resulting effect of each
statute is the same - the statutes subject plaintiffs to a higher burden of
pleading regarding the factual basis of their claim.205 As noted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Conley and Swierkiewicz, a premature search for
unmeritorious claims based on factual contentions conflicts with the default
functions instilled by the Federal Rules, which rely on liberal discovery methods
to flesh out the facts behind a petitioner's claims.2'
Therefore, the Oklahoma federal courts should consider decisions from states
with similar affidavit requirements within their respective statutes, such as
Georgia, and examine the reasoning used by courts that have interpreted
whether the statute directly collides with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. On
the other hand, the Oklahoma federal courts are not controlled and should not
be persuaded by cases involving dissimilar statutes, such as those requiring
Supp. 2d 1358, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609,611 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
199. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1998); 63 OKLA STAT. § 1708.1E (Supp. 2003).
200. Boone, 131 F.R.D. at 611.
201. FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(a)(2); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
202. Boone, 131 F.R.D. at 611.
203. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-1708.1E.
204. See GA. CODEANN. § 9-11-9.1.
205. See Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
206. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (stating that the simplified
standards for pleading in Rule 8 depend on "liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (noting that the "liberal opportunity
for discovery" and other procedures set forth by the Federal Rules, as described in footnote nine




postfiling affidavits rather than affidavits concurrent with filing. Thus, the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp.,
which considered the applicability of a Colorado statute in federal court that
required an affidavit of attorney certification within sixty days of filing of the
lawsuit, is not binding on the Oklahoma federal courts or the Tenth Circuit when
considering Oklahoma's Health Care Act.2°7
B. Federal Rule 8 Is a Valid Exercise of Procedural Power and Rule-Making
Because the scope of Federal Rule 8 is broad enough to cover the level of
pleading required in a medical malpractice action, federal courts must further
inquire into whether the Rule was validly enacted by Congress. First, the
federal court must classify Congress's delegation of power to the Supreme Court
to create the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as procedural or capable of being
rationally classified as either substantive or procedural. 2 ' Because the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure - particularly Rule 8, which sets forth the essential
procedure to initiate a federal action - create rules of procedure for federal
courts, Congress's delegation of power is clearly procedural. Second, the
federal court must make sure that Rule 8 does not "abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right."2' Because Congress failed to declare that Rule 8 violates
the Rules Enabling Act during its adoption process, 210 and because the Supreme
Court has never found Rule 8 to infringe upon any substantive right, Federal
Rule 8 is a valid enactment of Congress's power.2 '
Therefore, because the Health Care Act infringes upon an area of law clearly
governed by Rule 8 and because Rule 8 was valid in both its inception and its
application, federal courts applying Oklahoma law should reject the Health Care
Act's heightened pleading requirement. Instead, the federal courts should
adhere to Rule 8's requirement of a mere "short and plain statement of the
claim." '212
207. See generally Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir.
1996). Even the Trierweiler court noted its reluctance to impose state procedural rules on
federal proceedings for fear of encroaching on another branch's powers. Id. at 1540. Thus,
regardless of the variations in timing and other technical requirements, courts should recognize
that the results of state certificate of merit statutes are the same because of their tendency to
heighten the level of pleading required to initiate a lawsuit in federal court. See also Penrose
& Caldwell, supra note 128.
208. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
209. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
210. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
211. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "[tihere
is... no contention that Federal Rules 8 and 9 are beyond the scope of the Rules Enabling Act
or inconsistent with the Constitution").
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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C. Reconsidering the Usual Arguments for Applying Certificate of Merit
Statutes in Federal Court
Although Rule 8 clearly provides the required level of pleading in federal
courts and was a valid enactment of Congress's power, arguments are
nevertheless raised in favor of applying certificate of merit statutes in federal
court. Oklahoma federal courts should not apply the Health Care Act based on
arguments that a federal court's failure to apply it will encourage litigants to
forum shop. Once a federal court determines that Rule 8 directly collides with
the Health Care Act, the court should never even reach the "unguided Erie
analysis."2" 3 Instead, the court is required to apply the governing Federal
Rule.214 In other words, because the source of the federal law is a valid Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure that controls the issue of law before the court, the court
should never apply the branch of "judge-made federal law," leaving notions of
"Byrd balancing" and the "twin aims of Erie" inapplicable to the present
analysis." 5
Others might argue that by enacting the Oklahoma statute, the legislature
intended to reduce the number of frivolous suits brought against the medical
community. Thus, if federal courts do not apply the Health Care Act, litigants
will continue to flood the federal system with unmeritorious medical
malpractice complaints, contravening the Oklahoma legislature's clear desires
213. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
214. See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160. Hanna states that if a Federal Rule controls a
situation, the court must apply the rule and does not need to consider the typical "unguided"
Erie decision. Id.
215. See supra Part H.A. Consider, however, the result if a federal judge ignores the
guidance handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in determining whether Oklahoma's Health
Care Act applies in federal court. If a judge chooses to narrowly construe Rule 8 and declare
that the expert affidavit requirement applies in federal court, further examination would be
necessary under the judge-made rule prong of Erie, which ultimately leads to an analysis of
outcome-determination. See supra Part II.A. First, the judge would consider the extent of the
difference between the state law requiring attachment of an expert affidavit and the federal law,
which requires mere notice pleading. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. Second, the judge would
determine whether the variation between such laws would result in unfair discrimination against
citizens of the forum state. Id. Based on the deliberations of judges who have declared that
Rule 8 is not sufficiently broad to cover the state certificate of merit requirements, the judge is
likely to conclude in the affirmative to at least one of these two issues. If so, the judge should
also ensure that the Oklahoma statute does not infringe upon a federal affirmative countervailing
interest. See, e.g., Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1541 (10th
Cir. 1996). Considering that the only important federal governmental interest recognized by the
Supreme Court is the federal system's preference for a jury trial, a narrow interpretation of Rule
8 would easily lead ajudge to apply the pleading requirements of Oklahoma's Health Care Act




and contributing to escalating medical costs. This argument, however, is
unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has clearly held
that regardless of practical policy arguments," 6 any requirement of heightened
specificity in federal pleadings must be achieved through the appropriate
amendment process to the Federal Rules, not by mere judicial determination.1 7
Second, the Supreme Court has clarified that the pleading standard established
by Rule 8 is "without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits.
2 8
Therefore, by attempting to determine the merits of a plaintiffs claim based on
the initial pleading and any attached affidavits, the Health Care Act contravenes
Rule 8's policy of simply giving the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim.
Instead, Rule 8 relies on the Federal Rules' discovery and summary judgment
provisions to clarify issues and facts of the plaintiff's claim and to eliminate
meritless lawsuits.1 9
216. In applying Federal Rule 11, the Seventh Circuit has demonstrated the abuse of a
Federal Rule to achieve a public policy purpose. In 1986, the Seventh Circuit waged war
against frivolous lawsuits and applied sanctions under Rule 11 with vigorous force. Struve,
supra note 41, at 1142. In doing so, the court stated, "The rules, whether statutory or judge-
made, designed to discourage groundless litigation are being and will continue to be enforced
in this circuit to the hilt .... Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!" Dreis &
Krump Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247,255-56 (7th Cir. 1986)
("Mounting federal caseloads and growing public dissatisfaction with the costs and delays of
litigation have made it imperative that the federal courts impose sanctions on persons and firms
that abuse their right of access to these courts."). True to its word, the Seventh Circuit applied
Rule 11 not only to discourage violations as intended, but also to provide compensation for
injured parties. Struve, supra note 41, at 1146. The Supreme Court, however, reverted back
to the text of Rule 11 and rejected the Seventh Circuit's public policy approach. Id. By
proclaiming that Rule 11 does not shift fees among the parties, the Supreme Court rejected the
Seventh Circuit's compensation approach to Rule 11 and acknowledged that the main goal of
Rule 11 "is not to reward parties who are victimized by litigation." Id. (quoting Bus. Guides,
Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991)) (emphasis added). The
1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure furthered the Supreme Court's
decision by explicitly stating that the deterrence rationale behind Rule 11 provides that the
sanction "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated." Id. (quoting FED. R. CIrv. P. 1 1(c)(2) (1993)). Had the
Seventh Circuit interpreted and applied Rule 11 according to its text, such proclamations from
the Supreme Court and such an amendment to the Federal Rules would not have been necessary.
Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision coupled with Rule lI's amendment provides
evidence that courts must not read and interpret Federal Rules in a manner that furthers
preferable public policies.
217. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 512.
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VI. Conclusion
When federal courts determine whether to apply Oklahoma's Health Care Act
in federal court, the courts should adhere to binding U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. First, federal judges applying the Health Care Act should engage in
a "plain meaning" reading of Federal Rule 8, as expressly required in Walker.22
In doing so,judges should follow the law developed in Conley, Leatherman, and
Swierkiewicz, which together beautifully illustrate the magnitude of Rule 8's
scope and breadth.22' As noted in Leatherman, Rule 8 means what it says
regarding the sufficiency of a mere "short and plain statement of the claim.
' 22
Second, federal judges should recognize that Federal Rule 9, which
enumerates the actions that require more particularity in pleading, is silent
regarding complaints that allege liability for medical malpractice.223 Such
silence demonstrates that although Rule 9 has the ability to determine the
instances that require heightened pleading standards, it has declined to raise the
required level of pleading in medical liability actions.
Finally, judges should resist the temptation to apply the Health Care Act
based on policy arguments that its application will reduce the number of
frivolous lawsuits in Oklahoma.224 In doing so, Oklahoma federal courts will
inevitably come to the conclusion that the Health Care Act's application should
be limited to state court actions, and accordingly, federal judges should continue
to use Federal Rule 8 to measure the appropriate level of pleading in federal
court.
Dace A. Caldwell
220. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
221. See supra Part IV.
222. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
223. Cf. id. (noting that Rule 9(b) does not require heightened pleading for complaints
alleging municipal liability under § 1983).
224. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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